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WRONGFUL DEATH AND THE UNBORN
CHILD: SHOULD VIABILITY BE A
PREREQUISITE FOR A CAUSE
OF ACTION?
I. INTRODUCTION
Two sisters are enjoying a quiet dinner together. Beth has invited her
sister Amy over for dinner. Beth thought this would be a great opportu-
nity tc try the chicken cordon bleu frozen entree that her friends have
been praising. During their dinner discussion, Beth announces to her sis-
ter that she is eight weeks pregnant. Amy, who is in her seventh month
of pregnancy, is ecstatic. However, after dinner, Amy and Beth are not
ecstatic any more; they are violently ill. Both are rushed to the hospital
where their doctor informs them that they both contracted salmonella
poisoning from the chicken they had for dinner. The doctor tells them
that they will feel nauseous for a while but that they will recover fully.
However, both sisters have lost their babies. Both Amy and Beth bring
wrongful death suits against the frozen food company. Amy's suit is suc-
cessful, but Beth is not even allowed to bring her case to trial. The reason
behind the two different results is that Amy's unborn child was viable
while Beth's was not.'
This Comment explores the reasoning behind these surprisingly differ-
ent re:sults for the loss of a viable unborn child compared to the loss of
one wtIich is nonviable. The majority of states permit a wrongful death
action for an unborn child,2 but only six of those states allow a wrongful
death action for a nonviable fetus.' Many of the states within the major-
ity have held that viability is a prerequisite for the cause of action because
of the Supreme Court's landmark abortion decisions.4  Because the
1. This hypothetical is based loosely on the facts of Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms,
543 NAV.2d 787 (S.D. 1996). The sister in her third trimester was added for the sake of
comparison.
2. Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 528 (W. Va. 1995).
3. Santana v. Zilog, Inc., 95 F.3d 780, 784 (9th Cir. 1996)(noting that five states have
recognired a wrongful death action for a nonviable fetus through legislative enactments,
and that the West Virginia Supreme Court has recognized a cause of action for a nonviable
fetus).
4. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (developing the trimester approach for abor-
tions). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (Roe v. Wade's companion case strik-
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Supreme Court used the viability test as a basis for the protection of cer-
tain actions in abortion cases, many states decided to use the viability test
for all issues dealing with the unborn.5 As a result, the twenty-five year
old constitutional disputes and controversies surrounding the issue of
abortion have found their way into other areas of the law, particularly
those dealing with unborn children.6 Six states have realized that the via-
bility test is not necessarily appropriate when dealing with the issue of
ing down medical restrictions on abortion); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (ending the use of the trimester approach while reaffirming the
use of the viability line as the point after which abortions are no longer permitted); Ohio v.
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (upholding an Ohio law requiring that
one parent be notified 24 hours before a minor could receive the operation); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (striking down a Minnesota law requiring that a minor give
both parents at least 48 hours notice before she could have an abortion, but upholding a
provision which required 48 hour notification for one parent); Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (holding that a Missouri law prohibiting the use of
government facilities or hospitals for abortions was valid); Thornburgh v. American Col-
lege of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (striking down a law that required that a woman
receive seven explicit items of information about the fetus, and required a doctor to use the
best opportunity for the child to be aborted alive, and that a second physician be present to
provide immediate medical care for the child); Simopolus v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983)
(upholding a law requiring abortions performed after the twelfth week of pregnancy be
performed in hospitals or outpatient clinics); Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476
(1983) (upholding a law that required a pathology report after an abortion and that a
second physician be present during an abortion after viability); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (striking down provisions of a local Ohio law that
required all second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital, that girls under fifteen
years of age obtain parental consent or judicial approval); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398
(1981) (upholding a law which required doctors to notify the parents of an unemancipated
minor that the child was seeking an abortion); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (up-
holding the Hyde Amendment which denied Medicaid funds for an abortion except where
the life of the mother would be endangered or the pregnancy was a result of rape or incest
promptly reported to a law enforcement officer or the public health service); Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (striking down a Massachusetts law that required parental con-
sent before a minor could choose to have an abortion without providing an adequate "judi-
cial bypass" alternative); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (invalidating a law that
imposed a duty on doctors to preserve the life of the fetus); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438
(1977) (upholding a Medicaid regulation that denied funds for nontherapeutic abortions);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (Beal companion case upholding the Medicaid regula-
tion that denied funds for nontherapeutic abortions, even when the state paid medical
expenses incident to childbirth); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976) (striking down a Missouri law that required spousal and parental consent).
5. See infra, note 17 and accompanying text.
6. See Brief Amicus Curiae of National Right to Life, Inc. in Support of Casey in THE
SUPREME COURT CONFRONTS ABORTION: THE BRIEFS, ARGUMENT AND DECISION IN
Planned Parenthood v. Casey 265-67 (hereinafter Brief) (Leon Friedman ed. 1993) (con-
tending that Roe and its progeny have distorted and confused the law concerning unborn
children in non-abortion contexts).
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wrongful death of an unborn child, because the viability test was estab-
lished to balance a woman's right to privacy and choice, with the state's
interest in promoting life.7 These states decided that they will not use
the lines drawn by the trimester and viability tests to decide cases dealing
with th e wrongful death of an unborn child caused by a third person.8 It
is somewhat appropriate that the crux of this issue is line drawing because
the history of the development of wrongful death actions is replete with
lines drawn and then redrawn.9
Recent court decisions in South Dakota,' ° Idaho," West Virginia, 2
and Alabama 3 have explored this unsettled issue of whether viability
should be a prerequisite to a wrongful death cause of action. The vast
majority of states allow a cause of action for children who are injured in
utero and are eventually born alive.' 4 Fewer states permit recovery for
the wrongful death of a fetus in utero."i Currently thirty-seven states per-
mit a wrongful death cause of action for a viable' 6 unborn child.' 7 Of the
7. See Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 530.
8. 4d.
9. See discussion infra § II.
10. Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996).
11. Santana v. Zilog, Inc., 95 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 1996).
12. See Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 522.
13. Gentry v. Gilmore, 613 So.2d 1241 (Ala. 1993).
14. Santana, 95 F.3d at 783.
15. M.
16. A viable unborn child is "capable of independent existence outside his or her
mother'E. womb, even if only in an incubator." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1566 (6th ed.
1990) (citations omitted).
17. See Espadero v. Feld, 649 F.Supp. 1480 (D. Colo. 1986); Simmons v. Howard
Univ., 323 F.Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971); Wade v. U.S., 745 F. Supp. 1573 (D. Haw. 1990);
Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 300 So.2d 354 (Ala. 1974); Summerfield v. Super. Ct., 698
P.2d 712 (Ariz. 1985); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 224 A.2d 406 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1956); Porter
v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d 100 (Ga. App. 1955); Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1982); Seef
v. Sutkus, 583 N.E.2d 510 (Ill. 1991); Britt v. Sears, 277 N.E.2d 20 (Ind. App. 1971); Hale
v. Manion, 368 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1962); Rice v. Rizk, 453 S.W.2d 732 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970);
Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So.2d 633 (La. 1981); State Use of Odham v. Sherman, 198 A.2d
71 (Md. 1964); Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 1975); O'Neill v.
Morse, 1.88 N.W.2d 785 (Mich. 1971); Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949);
Terrel v. Rankin, 511 So.2d 126 (Miss. 1987); Connor v. Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo.
1995) (en banc); Strzelczyk v. Jett, 870 P.2d 730 (Mont. 1994); White v. Yup, 458 P.2d 617
(Nev. 1969); Wallace v. Wallace, 421 A.2d 134 (N.H. 1980); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp.
619 P.2d 826 (N.M. 1980); DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1987); Hopkins v.
McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1984); Werling v. Sandy, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (Ohio 1985);
Evans v, Olsen, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976); Libee v. Permanente Clinic, 518 P.2d 636 (Or.
1974); Coveleski v. Bubnis, 634 A.2d 608 (Pa. 1993); Fowler v. Woodward 138 S.E.2d 42
(S.C. 1954); Farley v. Mount Marty Hosp. Assoc., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 42 (S.D. 1986); Vail-
lancourt v. Medical Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., Inc., 425 A.2d 92 (Vt. 1980); Moen v. Hanson, 537
19981
424 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 14:421
twenty-one states whose courts have dealt with the issue of whether or
not to extend wrongful death actions to a nonviable fetus, only six cur-
rently allow recovery for wrongful death.'" The other fifteen states have
decided not to extend a wrongful death cause of action to a nonviable
fetus.' 9 This split among the states demonstrates the tension between the
law's treatment of a fetus, and medicine's expanding understanding of
prenatal physiological development and technology. 0
Some courts are reluctant to extend the protection of their state's
wrongful death statute to in utero deaths without clear legislative direc-
tion due to the statutory nature and history of the wrongful death cause
of action." Some courts are concerned that interpreting wrongful death
statutes to include a nonviable unborn child as a "person" for the pur-
poses of the wrongful death statute would create an "inherent conflict"
between a woman's constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy prior
P.2d 266 (Wash. 1975); Baldwin v. Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428 (W.Va. 1971); Kwaterski v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 148 N.W.2d 107 (Wis. 1967).
18. The six states that have recognized a cause of action for the tortious death of a
nonviable unborn child are:
Illinois - Seef v. Sutkus, 583 N.E.2d 510 (Ill. 1991);
Louisiana - Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So.2d 633 (La. 1981);
Missouri - Connor v. Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1995);
South Dakota - Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996);
West Virginia - Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995); and
Georgia - Porter v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d 100 (Ga. App. 1955) (permitting recovery if the
unborn child is "quick," or capable of moving in its mother's womb).
19. See Santana, 95 F.3d at 783. See e.g. Wade v. United States, 745 F. Supp. 1573 (D.
Haw. 1990); Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1962); Gentry v. Gilmore, 613
So.2d 1241 (Ala. 1993); Ferguson v. District of Columbia, 629 A.2d 15 (D.C. 1993); Humes
v. Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032 (Kan. 1990); Kandel v. White, 663 A.2d 1264 (Md. 1995); Thibert
v. Mika, 646 N.E.2d 1025 (Mass. 1995); Fryover v. Forbes, 446 N.W.2d 292 (Mich. 1989);
Wallace v. Wallace, 421 A.2d 134 (N.H. 1980); Miller v. Kirk, 905 P.2d 194 (N.M. 1995);
Egan v. Smith, 622 N.E.2d 1191 (Ohio App. 1993); Guyer v. Hugo Pub. Co. 830 P.2d 1393
(Okla. App. 1991); Coveleski v. Bubnis, 634 A.2d 608 (Pa. 1993); Micolis v. AMICA Mut.
Ins. Co., 587 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1991); West v. McCoy, 105 S.E.2d 88 (S.C. 1958).
20. See ASSESSMENT AND CARE OF THE FETUS: PHYSIOLOGICAL, CLINICAL, AND
MEDICOLEGAL PRINCIPLES 2-15 (Robert D. Eden, M.D., et al eds. 1990) (describing the
various aspects of fetal development). See also COMMITrEE ON FETAL EXTRAUTERINE
SURVIVABILITY, NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, FETAL ExTRA-
UTERINE SURVIVABILITY (1988) (discussing the determination of the stage of gestational
development at which the fetus can survive outside the womb, the advances in per-
inatology over the past decade which steadily reduced the age for fetal survival, the grow-
ing perception that technology would soon push back the frontiers of fetal survivability to
the moment of conception, and the committee's conclusion that 23-24 weeks is the thresh-
old of fetal survival).
21. Santana, 95 F.3d at 784.
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to viability22 and the wrongful death cause of action for a nonviable fe-
tus. 23 Other courts do not want to stand in the minority and wish to defer
to the majority.24
First, this Comment examines both sides of the issue with respect to
expanding the protection of wrongful death statutes to a nonviable fetus.
Next, it reviews the development and growth of prenatal torts, the wrong-
ful dea:h cause of action, and its extension to unborn children. Then, it
analyzes whether or not recognition of a cause of action for a nonviable
fetus would erode the right of a woman to procure an abortion, and
thereby violate the Supreme Court's holding in Roe v. Wade25 and its
progeny.26 Finally, this Comment calls for an end to the use of the Roe
viability test as a prerequisite for the wrongful death cause of action.
27
22. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
23. See Kandel v. White, 663 A.2d 1264, 1267-68 (Md. 1995).
24. See Coveleski v. Bubnis, 634 A.2d 608, 609 (Pa. 1993) (stating that the court will
not be "placing Pennsylvania by itself as providing a wrongful death action for an eight
week old fetus.") Id.
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
26. See e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747 (1986) (holding that a state may not impose restrictions on doctor/patient rela-
tions tha: are intended to discourage the performance of abortions); Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming the essential holding of Roe
recognizing a woman's right to choose an abortion before fetal viability, and holding that
the undue burden test, rather than the trimester framework, should be used in evaluating
abortion restrictions before viability); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S.
490 (198)) (disregarding the trimester approach and focusing more on viability as the
threshold when a state may regulate abortion).
27. Although "maternal-fetal conflict" issues such as prosecuting mothers for drug and
alcohol abuse while pregnant are somewhat closely aligned with wrongful death actions for
unborn children, a discussion of these "maternal-fetal conflict" issues would call for a very
different analysis regarding Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and its recognition of a
mother's right to privacy. See Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997) (upholding the
sentence of a woman who ingested cocaine during her third trimester of pregnancy); see
also Edward Walsh, In Case Against Alcoholic Mother, Underlying Issue is Fetal Rights;
Attempted Murder Charge Presents "Minefield" of Legal Questions, WASH. POST, Oct. 7,
1996, at A4 (reporting on a Wisconsin district court holding that a woman who attempted
to drink her unborn child to death must stand trial for attempted murder). For a discussion
of the "maternal-fetal conflict" see DEBORAH MATHIEU, PREVENTING PRENATAL HARM:
SHOULD THE STATE INTERVENE? (2d ed. 1996); BONNIE STEINBOCK, PH.D., LIFE BEFORE
BIRTH: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF EMBRYOS AND FETUSES 127-63 (1992);
Carolyn Coffey, Note, Whitner v. State: Aberrational Judicial Response or Wave of the
Future Fqr Maternal Substance Abuse Cases?, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 211
(1997); Rebekah R. Arch, RN, Comment, The Maternal-Fetal Rights Dilemma: Honoring a
Woman's Choice of Medical Care During Pregnancy, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
637 (1995); Robin Abcarain, A New Strategy for Pregnancy Police, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 18,
1996, at El; and Scot Lehigh, Common Sense or a New Way to Ban Abortion, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 15, 1996, at D1.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Development of Wrongful Death Actions
Currently, all fifty states permit a wrongful death cause of action al-
lowing relatives or heirs of a deceased person to sue the tortfeasor re-
sponsible for the death. However, past history indicates that this was not
always the case.28 The common law did not provide a wrongful death
action for victim's relatives.29 In 1808, Lord Ellenborough declared that
"in a civil court the death of a human being could not be complained of as
an injury."30 The deceased obviously was unable to complain of the in-
jury, and although a spouse, or parent had a cause of action against a
tortfeasor for expenditures and for the loss of services or society, result-
ing from a nonfatal injury, spouses or parents of the deceased were de-
nied a cause of action for a similar loss resulting from the death of the
wife or child.31 Hence, when the victim died, so did the cause of action.32
By allowing a cause of action to die with the victim, it became "cheaper
to kill a person than to scratch him."33
To correct this "intolerable result,, 34 England's Parliament passed the
first wrongful death statute, Lord Campbell's Act,35 in 1846.36 Over time,
all fifty of the United States eventually followed England's Parliament by
adopting wrongful death statutes.37 Most of the statutes enacted in the
United States were modeled after Lord Campbell's Act, which created a
new cause of action for the victim's family or others who might have suf-
fered a loss from the victim's death.38
The wrongful death statutes continued to develop after their enactment
in the middle of the nineteenth century.39 Initially, courts limited recov-
28. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 127, at
945 (5th ed. 1984).
29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808)).
31. KEETON ET AL., supra note 28, at 942.
32. Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 525 (W. Va. 1995).
33. KEETON ET AL., supra note 28, at 942. Some unfounded legends report that the
"cheaper to kill than to scratch" result was "the original reason that passengers in Pullman
car berths rode with their heads to the front [and] that the fire axes in railroad coaches
were provided to enable the conductor to deal efficiently with those merely injured." Id. at
942 n.24.
34. Id. at 945.
35. Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act), 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch.93 (Eng.).
36. KEETON ET AL., supra note 28, at 945.
37. Id. at 945-46.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 935-51.
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ery to the tangible loss of the pecuniary benefits associated with the de-
ceased because of the difficulty in evaluating mental and emotional
damages suffered by the survivors, and the victim's possible future earn-
ings.4" Over time, however, many developments and changes have oc-
cured.41 The recent trend in wrongful death actions allows recovery for
intangible losses, such as the value of the services the victim could have
perforrmed,41 and the loss of the deceased's love and affection, otherwise
known as the loss of society.43
Through the creation and continuous development of wrongful death
statute;, the law has worked to remedy the unjust results that occurred
prior to the enactment of Lord Campbell's Act, but there is still a need
for judicial action to fill the gaps of the statute.44 Regardless of the gaps
that still exist in the wrongful death statutes, the law no longer promotes
the theory that it is cheaper to kill a person than merely to injure him.
B. The Development of Prenatal Torts: Moving From the Single-entity
View to the Born Alive View
As the wrongful death cause of action developed throughout time, so
too did recognition that a fetus could be injured separately and distinctly
from its mother. Today, every jurisdiction in the United States recognizes
a cause of action for the consequences of tortious prenatal injuries for an
unborn child who is subsequently born alive.45 However, until 1946, most
courts did not allow actions for prenatal injuries.46 Following a decision
by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, then a member of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court,47 most courts failed to see the unborn child as
existing at the time of the action and accordingly, held that the defendant
owed no duty to someone not in existence.48
In 1884, Holmes first articulated his "single-entity view",49 in Dietrich v.
40. Id. at 951.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. See also Gary A. Meadows, Commentary, Wrongful Death and the Lost Society
of the Unborn, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 99, 108-11 (1992) (discussing the various approaches
used by courts to determine the loss of society element of damages).
44. KEETON ET AL., supra note 28, at 960.
45. Id, at 368.
46. Id.
47. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
48. Id.
49. See Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 526 (W. Va. 1995). See also Barbara A. Lingle,
Allowing Fetal Wrongful Death Actions in Arkansas: A Death Whose Time Has Come, 44
ARK. L. REV. 465 (1991) (discussing the "single-entity" view).
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Inhabitants of Northampton.51 In Dietrich, a woman who was approxi-
mately four months pregnant miscarried her baby after she slipped and
fell on a defective stretch of highway.51 Holmes found no precedent stat-
ing that the infant could maintain an action for its prenatal injuries if it
subsequently survived.5" Therefore, he found no reason to maintain an
action when an infant did not survive.5 3 He reasoned that an injury to an
infant would also be an injury to the mother, and thus the mother would
be entitled to recover for her injuries.5 4 This concept, known as the "sin-
gle-entity" view, states that "a fetus is part of its mother rather than an
independent biological entity,"55 and was widely followed for over fifty
years.5 6
The single-entity view was not without its critics.57 In 1900, Illinois
Supreme Court Justice Boggs, dissenting in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospi-
tal,58 criticized the single-entity view as "sacrificing truth to a mere theo-
retical abstraction to say the injury was not to the child, but wholly to the
mother."59 While Boggs agreed with Holmes that there was no precedent
to award damages to an infant who suffered prenatal injuries, Boggs did
not want to follow a precedent that sacrificed the truth.6 °
Boggs considered precedent useful as an illustration of general princi-
ples, but found that prior case law should not be the ultimate measure of
those principles.6 1 Boggs knew that future cases bringing unique and
novel issues would continue to arise, but that courts could not be dis-
tracted by these "peculiar" issues.62 Courts must see through these pecu-
liar issues to find the governing principle.6 3 Boggs stated that the
principles that should have governed in Allaire were general tort princi-
ples giving redress for personal injuries caused by the actions or negli-
50. 138 Mass. at 17.
51. Id. at 14.
52. Id. at 15.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 17.
55. Lingle, supra note 49, at 469.
56. Id.
57. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 28, at 368.
58. 56 N.E. 638 (I11. 1900) (The majority followed the single-entity view, holding that
an infant who was injured while in utero could not maintain an action for injuries received
before birth).
59. Id. at 641 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
60. See id. at 640-41.
61. Id. at 640.
62. Id. at 641.
63. Id.
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gence of another.64 In denying the right of action for the injured infant,
the Alaire court was not being faithful to those general principles. The
Allaire court was allowing Dietrich and the single-entity view to be "the
measure of the principle"65 rather than an illustration of it.66 In Boggs's
opinion, "[i]t is but natural justice that an infant, if born alive, should be
allowed to maintain an action in the courts for injuries it received in the
womb.",' 67 With his dissent, Justice Boggs began redrawing the line that
Justice Holmes created in 1884, and laid the groundwork for the "born
alive" rule.68
In 1946, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, in Bon-
brest v. Kotz, 69 was the first court to depart from the single-entity view,
and follow the born alive rule advocated in Boggs's dissent in'Allaire.7°
In Bonbrest, the plaintiffs brought an action based on the injuries an in-
fant allegedly suffered during delivery.7" The defendants moved for sum-
mary judgment, arguing they owed no duty to an infant not yet in
existence. 72 The court denied the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, allowing the action to proceed because of the inherent unfairness
in not compensating a child for an infirmity. 73 The court reasoned that an
infant who demonstrates an ability to survive outside the womb after sus-
taining injuries at the hands of a third party ought to have his day in
court.7'1
Departing from Dietrich, the Bonbrest court criticized the use of a long
outmoded legal fiction which gave no remedy to an infant injured by an-
other's negligence. 75 Although there were no previous decisions allowing
an action for prenatal injuries, the court stated that the absence of prece-
dent should not act as a shield for those who, through intentional or neg-
64. i'd.
65. Id. at 640.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 642.
68. Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 526 (W. Va. 1995). See also Murphy S. Klasing,
The Death of an Unborn Child: Jurisprudential Inconsistencies in Wrongful Death, Criminal
Homicide, and Abortion Cases, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 933, 935-36 (1995) (discussing the "born
alive" rule).
69. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C 1946).
70. id. at 138.
71. d.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 143.
74. See id. at 142.
75. Id. at 142.
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ligent actions, have breached their duty of care to another.7 6 In the
court's view, no right "is more inherent, and more sacrosanct, than that of
the individual in his possession and enjoyment of his life, his limbs and his
body.",77 Criticizing the courts of the nineteenth century for proceeding
over-cautiously, 78 the Bonbrest court would not be strictly tied down to
an illogical or outdated precedent.79 The court wrote that the law must
keep pace with science and technology, and when changing conditions
and advances in technology, such as our understanding of prenatal devel-
opment and medicine, make precedent inappropriate, it should no longer
be followed.8" The court continued its analysis by quoting Chief Justice
Harlan Stone: "If, with discerning eye, we see differences as well as re-
semblances in the facts and experiences of the present when compared
with those recorded in the precedents, we take the decisive step toward
the achievement of a progressive science of law."'"
The floodgates argument that fictitious claims would result did not dis-
suade the Bonbrest court from taking a decisive step toward the progres-
sive science of law.82 The court recognized that cases of this character
might be difficult to prove.83 However, the court was more concerned
with the right of the child's representatives to have a chance to prove
their case, than with the possible difficulties they might encounter once
they reached the court.84
The Bonbrest decision began a trend of going beyond the single-entity
rule.85 Currently, every jurisdiction permits a child, who is subsequently
born alive, to bring an action for prenatal injuries, and allows a wrongful
death action if the child dies of such injuries after birth.86 Generally, the




79. See id. (stating "[t]he law is presumed to keep pace with the sciences and medical
science certainly has made progress since 1884.") Id.
80. See id. at 143.
81. Id. at 142 (quoting Chief Justice Harlan Stone, Common Law and the United
States, 50 HARv. L. REV. 4, 9-10 (1936)).
82. Id. at 142-43. See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 28, at 367-68 (discussing the
difficulty of proving the causal connection between the negligent act and injury to the fetus
and how this difficulty could lead to possible fictitious claims).
83. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 142-43.
84. Id.
85. KEETON ET AL., supra note 28, at 368.
86. Id. (citations omitted).
87. Klasing, supra note 68, at 936.
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rejecting the single-entity view, the born alive rule corrected the patent
unfairness in the theory that no duty was owed to unborn children.88
The born alive rule, however, has been subject to criticism as well.89
Many have criticized the rule for being too stringent. 90 For example, in
states applying the born alive rule, a child's estate can recover for the
child's wrongful death if it is born alive and dies two hours later, but if the
"childbirth process lasted a little longer and the child [had] been stillborn
two hours later, his estate would not have been able to recover."91 This
judicial line drawing based upon the passage of time rather than the is-
sues at hand narrowed the scope of the born alive rule and produced
some unfair results.92 Eventually, this rule was broadened by the holding
in Verkennes v. Corniea,93 which expanded the Bonbrest rule by allowing
an action for prenatal wrongful death based on the fetus's viability.94
C. Prenatal Wrongful Death: Moving From the Born Alive Rule to
Prenatal Wrongful Death-The Law Continues to Evolve
In 1939, the Supreme Court of Minnesota became the first court in the
United States to recognize a cause of action for the wrongful death of an
unborn child. 95 Although both mother and child died during labor, the
court, in Verkennes, viewed these facts as somewhat analogous to the
facts of Bonbrest, and decided to adhere to the principles expressed in
both Bonbrest, and the Allaire dissent.96 The court determined that the
law must keep pace with science, thus concluding that it was no longer
acceptable to view an unborn child as part of the mother.97 By latching
on to the viability language used in Bonbrest, the court held that Minne-
88. Id. at 935-36
89. See id. at 935-37.
90. See id. at 935-36.
91. Id. at 938 (citing Kalafut v. Gruver, 389 S.E.2d 681 (Va. 1990) in which the
Suprenie Court of Virginia permitted the estate of a child who had died less than two hours
after birth to recover for his wrongful death).
92. Brief, supra, note 6 (noting the confusion surrounding the law concerning unborn
children in non-abortion contexts).
93. 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949).
94. Id. at 838-39.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 841.
97. Id. The court reasoned that the unborn child "has, if viable, its own bodily form
and members, manifests all of the anatomical characteristics of individuality, possesses its
own circulatory, vascular and excretory systems and is capable now of being ushered into
the visible world." Id.
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sota's wrongful death statute would support an action for the unborn
child. The court reasoned:
Its language is clear. Thereunder a cause of action arises when
death is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, and
the personal representative of the decedent may maintain such
action on behalf of the next of kin of decedent. It seems too
plain for argument that where independent existence is possible
and life is destroyed through a wrongful act a cause of action
arises under the statutes cited.98
The Verkennes decision initiated the use of the viability test in cases
involving the death of an unborn child. Although the Minnesota Court's
view has not been followed as frequently as the Bonbrest decision, a ma-
jority of jurisdictions now permit wrongful death actions if the unborn
child has reached the point of viability.99 The viability test has been
adopted by many states because of the trimester/viability framework that
was set forth in the landmark abortion cases Roe v. Wade1"' and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.''
D. Abortion and the Use of the Viability Test
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court held a Texas law, which
criminalized abortion at any point during a pregnancy unless the mother's
life was in danger, unconstitutional because it violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.' In holding the Texas law unconstitutional, the Court
found an implicit right to privacy in the Constitution, and that this right to
privacy protected a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. 10 3 By
recognizing the right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy, the Court
rejected the argument that a fetus "is a 'person' within the language and
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,"' 4 thereby giving it a constitu-
tional right to life.' 0 5 The Court noted that if it were to adopt Texas's
argument that a fetus is a "person" who could not be deprived of life
without due process of law, the statute would be "out of line with the
98. Id.
99. Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 528 (W. Va. 1995).
100. 410 U.S. 113, 113 (1973).
101. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). See Lingle, supra note 49, at 483-84 (discussing some courts'
use of Roe and Casey as authority when deciding prenatal wrongful death cases).
102. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
103. STEINBOCK, supra note 27, at 43.
104. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156.
105. Id. at 156-57.
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Amendment's command"' 6 because the statute allows the performance
of abortions to save the life of the mother.10 7
The Court recognized a woman's right to an abortion, reasoning that a
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy was under the broad constitu-
tional right to privacy. 108 The Court stated:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined,
in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy. 10 9
The Court recognized that a woman had protected privacy interests in
her choice to terminate her pregnancy, however the Court did not see this
as an absolute right to terminate her pregnancy whenever, and however
she chose." 0 While the Court concluded that a woman had a right to
choose to have an abortion, that right must be balanced against the state's
interest in protecting potential life."'
The Court decided that the state's interest becomes sufficiently com-
pelling at the point of viability because the fetus then has the capability of
106. Id. at 157 n.54.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 153-64.
109. Id. at 153. While "[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of pri-
vacy.. the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain
areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution." Id. at 152. Discussing how
the Court found this right to privacy existing in the Constitution, the Court stated:
[i]rt varying contexts, the Court, or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least
the roots of that right in the First Amendment, in the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments, in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, in the Ninth Amendment, or in the
concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The-se decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed "fun-
damental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" are included in this
guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it clear that the right has some
extension to activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, and child
rearing and education.
Id. at 152-53.
110. Id. at 153.
111. See id. at 154, stating:
The Court's decisions recognizing a right to privacy also acknowledge that some
state regulation in areas protected by that ight is appropriate. As noted above, a
State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in maintain-
ing medical standards, and in protecting potential life. At some point in preg-
nancy, these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain
regulation of the factors that govern the abortion decision.
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living outside the mother's womb. 112 Recognizing viability as the com-
pelling point of state interest, the Court initiated the trimester approach
in order to provide a sliding scale on which to balance a pregnant wo-
man's right to privacy with the state's obligation to preserve life and
health.
113
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,"4 the
Supreme Court" 5 reaffirmed Roe's holding recognizing a woman's right
to choose an abortion before viability,"6 but rejected the "rigid trimester
framework of Roe v.Wade."' 117 Instead, the Court adopted the "undue
burden" analysis."' In explaining the undue burden analysis the Court
stated:
[a] finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion
that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a sub-
stantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is invalid because
the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential
life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not
hinder it." 9
At issue in Casey was Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act.120 The
112. Id. at 163.
113. Id. at 154. The Court's decision to utilize the trimester approach meant that,
during the first trimester, the abortion decision must be left to the woman and the medical
judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician. During the second trimester, the
state may choose to regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to
maternal health, such as who is qualified to perform an abortion and where an abortion
can take place. During the third trimester, or "the stage subsequent to viability," the state,
in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and
even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for
the preservation of the life or health of the mother. Id. at 164.
114. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
115. The Court's opinion was written jointly by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Sou-
ter. Justices Blackmun and Stevens concurred in their reaffirmation of Roe's essential
holding recognizing a woman's right to choose to have an abortion. Id. at 844, 912, 923.
116. Id. at 846.
117. Id. at 878.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 877.
120. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3201-3220 (1990). The five provisions of the Act that
Planned Parenthood challenged required:
that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent prior to the abor-
tion, and specifies that she be provided with certain information at least 24 hours
before the abortion is performed. For a minor to obtain an abortion, the Act
requires the informed consent of one of her parents, but provides for a judicial
bypass option if the minor does not wish to or cannot obtain a parent's consent.
Another provision of the Act requires that, unless certain exceptions apply, a
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Court found that only one provision, spousal notification, violated the
undue burden analysis.' 2 ' The Court reasoned that some women would
not want to notify their spouses about their abortion decision for fear of
domestic violence., Therefore the spousal notification provision was an
undue burden because it would "operate as a substantial obstacle to a
woman's choice to undergo an abortion.'
'1 22
Casey followed the reasoning of Roe, in that the state could not place
an undue burden on a woman's choice to terminate her pregnancy before
viability.123 The Court admitted that "[any judicial act of line-drawing
may seem somewhat arbitrary,' 24 but the viability line has an element of
fairness that was developed with great care. 25 The viability line was de-
veloped with great care so that the Court might come to a fair and worka-
ble balance of the two competing interests in the abortion issue. 1 26 In its
attempt to come to a fair and workable balance between the state's inter-
est in promoting fetal life, and a woman's interest in her right to choose,
the Court decided to reject the trimester framework set out in Roe be-
cause 'it undervalues the State's interest in potential life.' 127
married woman seeking an abortion must sign a statement indicating that she has
notified her husband of her intended abortion. The act exempts compliance with
the:;e three requirements in the event of a "medical emergency" which is defined
in § 3203 of the Act. In addition to the above provisions regulating the perform-
ance of abortions, the Act imposes certain reporting requirements on facilities
tha: provide abortion services.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 844 (citations omitted).
121. Id. at 898, 922-23. Justice Stevens concurred with the O'Connor-Kennedy-Souter
opinion that the spousal notification provision was an undue burden, but he also believed
the counseling and waiting periods were also unconstitutional because they placed an un-
due burden on a woman's abortion decision. Id. at 922. Justice Blackmun would have held
all of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act invalid. Id. at
926. Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas would have
upheld all of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute. Id. at 944. All this
translates into a 5-4 decision to invalidate the spousal notification requirement, a 7-2 deci-
sion to uphold the counseling and 24-hour waiting period provisions, and an 8-1 decision to
uphold the other provisions.
122. Id. at 895.




127. Id. at 874. The majority concluded:
The Court's experience applying the trimester framework has led to the striking
down of some abortion regulations which in no real sense deprived women of the
ultimate decision. Those decisions went too far because the right recognized by
Roe is a right "to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child."
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In rejecting the trimester framework, the Court stated that all burdens
placed on a woman when making her choice to terminate her pregnancy
are not necessarily undue.a 8 The Court concluded that "the undue bur-
den standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the State's interest
with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty," 12 9 and the viability
line will continue to be the appropriate line for determining when the
woman's constitutionally protected liberty is outweighed by the State's
compelling interest in the protection of potential life.13°
E. Does Prenatal Wrongful Death Include the Nonviable?
Recently, four courts have dealt with the issue of prenatal wrongful
death actions. Both South Dakota"' and West Virginia' 3 2 abandoned
the use of the viability test in prenatal wrongful death actions, while the
Supreme Court of Alabama,133 and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, interpreting Idaho law,13 4 held that it was appropri-
ate to keep the viability line in place for prenatal wrongful death ac-
tions. 1 35 These decisions illustrate the current split among the states on
how to handle the issue of wrongful death of a nonviable unborn child.
1. Idaho and Alabama Maintain the Viability Line
In 1993, the Supreme Court of Alabama grappled with the issue of pre-
viable wrongful death and held that the family of a thirteen-week-old fe-
tus did not have a cause of action.136 The court concluded that the term
"minor child" within the Alabama Wrongful Death Act 13' does not in-
clude a fetus that has not yet reached the point of viability. 38 The Gentry
Court relied on Roe139 and Casey1 40 to support its holding that a fetus
must first reach the point of viability before a wrongful death action can
Id. at 875 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
128. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
129. Id.
130. See id. at 870-71.
131. Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996).
132. Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d. 522 (W. Va. 1995).
133. Gentry v. Gilmore, 613 So. 2d 1241 (Ala. 1993).
134. Santana v. Zilog, Inc., 95 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 1996).
135. Gentry, 613 So. 2d at 1241; Santana, 95 F.3d at 780.
136. Gentry, 613 So. 2d at 1244.
137. ALA. CODE § 6-5-391 (1975).
138. Gentry, 613 So. 2d at 1244.
139. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
140. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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arise.1 4 1
In Santana v. Zilog Inc.,142 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, interpreting Idaho law, also rejected the cause of action for
a nonviable fetus, albeit using a different rationale than the Alabama
court. 43 The court stated that it was not a federal court's place to expand
Idaho's Wrongful Death Act 14 4 to cover a nonviable fetus without some
"clear direction" 145 from the Idaho legislature or courts indicating their
desire to implement the minority view 146 and recognize a pre-viability
wrongful death action. 14
7
Invoking the two most prevalent arguments for limiting liability to the
wrongful death of viable fetuses only, the court reasoned that the crux of
the case was determining when life began and when a fetus becomes a
"person.' 148 Philosophers, theologians, and politicians have not found
any easy solutions to the dilemma of determining exactly when life be-
gins, and likewise, the court did not offer any.' 49 The court agreed that
drawing the line at viability might be a "somewhat arbitrary distinc-
tion,"' 5 ° but decided that viability provided a "logical point at which to
halt further judicial extension of the [wrongful death] cause of action."''
It considered it the Idaho legislature's responsibility to include nonviable
fetuses in the cause of action, and determine when life begins. 52
Gentry and Santana exemplify two different approaches to rejecting the
pre-viability wrongful death action. Gentry demonstrates the use of the
viability doctrine of Roe to reject the cause of action. 153 Santana employs
judicial restraint, and defers expansion of pre-natal wrongful death ac-
tions to the state legislature. 154 Both express their reluctance to afford
the protection of wrongful death statutes to nonviable fetuses.
141. Gentry, 613 So. 2d at 1244.
142. 95 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 1996).
143. Jd. at 781.
144. IDAHO CODE § 5-311 (1990).
145. Santana, 95 F.3d at 786.
146. See e.g., Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d (W. Va. 1995); Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms,
543 N.W,2d 787 (S.D. 1996).
147. Santana, 95 F.3d at 785.





153. Gentry v. Gilmore, 613 So. 2d 1241, 1244 (Ala. 1993).
154. Santana, 95 F.3d at 786.
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2. South Dakota and West Virginia Move Beyond the Viability
Prerequisite
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms,'55
extended the prenatal wrongful death action beyond viability because of
an indication from the state legislature that it desired this result.156 The
court held that under South Dakota's wrongful death statute,' 57 the
Wiersma's had a valid wrongful death action which guaranteed protection
to "a person, including an unborn child.' 1 58 The statute incorporates the
words "unborn child," and thus the Wiersma court found it easier to rec-
ognize wrongful death actions for children in utero before viability, as
opposed to statutes in other states which simply say "person," "minor
child," "natural person," or "one. 15 9
The defense argued that the South Dakota statute's use of the term
"unborn child" only protected viable unborn children because of the in-
consistency in allowing a cause of action for wrongful death of a non-
viable fetus, while allowing a woman to procure an abortion up to the
twenty-fourth week of pregnancy.' 60 The court did not accept defendant
Maple Leaf's argument. 161 To accept Maple Leaf Farm's argument
"would, ironically, give the tortfeasor the same rights as the mother to
155. 543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996).
156. Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787, 790 (S.D. 1996) (an action for
wrongful death of the Wiersma's clearly nonviable seven to eight week old fetus caused by
the salmonella poisoning Mrs. Wiersma contracted from eating a Maple Leaf Farms
Chicken Cordon Bleu frozen entree). See also Lehigh, supra note 27, at D1 (discussing
Wiersma).
157. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-5-1 (Michie 1987). The statute provides:
Whenever the death or injury of a person, including an unborn child, shall be
caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect, or default is
such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover
damages in respect thereto, if the death had not ensued, then and in every such
case, the corporation which, or the person who, would have been liable, if death
had not ensued, or the administrator or executor of the estate of such person as
such administrator or executor, shall be liable, to an action for damages, notwith-
standing the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been
caused under such circumstances as amount in law to a felony; and when the
action is against such administrator or executor, the damages recovered shall be a
valid claim against the estate of such deceased person. However, an action under
this section involving an unborn child shall be for the exclusive benefit of the
mother or the lawfully married parents of the unborn child).
Id.
158. Wiersma, 543 N.W.2d at 790.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 791.
161. Id.
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terminate a pregnancy." '162 "A woman has a privacy interest in terminat-
ing her pregnancy, however, defendant[s] [have] no such interest."' 63
The South Dakota Supreme Court also found no need to use the viabil-
ity test as it has been used in abortion cases, to determine if liability
should be extended. It stated:
the concept of viability is outmoded in tort law. "Viability" as a
developmental turning point was embraced in abortion cases to
balance the privacy rights of a mother as against her unborn
child. For any other purpose, viability is purely an arbitrary
milestone from which to reckon a child's legal existence. Viabil-
ity of course does not affect the question of the legal existence
of the unborn, and therefore of the defendant's duty, and it is a
most unsatisfactory criterion, since it is a relative matter, de-
pending on the health of the mother and child and many other
matters in addition to the stage of development. 164
The court concluded that the statute's language protecting unborn chil-
dren gave parents a cause of action regardless of their unborn child's
viability.16
5
In Farley v. Sartin,6 6 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,
while encouraging its legislature to define the word "person" in the stat-
utes, 167 did not wait for some indication of the legislature's intent when it
held that a father could maintain a cause of action for the death of an
unborn child, regardless of viability. 168 With reasoning similar to
Wiersma, the court recognized that following the viability standard would
promote injustice and lead to inequitable results. 169  Furthermore, the
court found that following the viability standard would run contrary to
the underlying principle of tort law that injured parties should be com-
pensated for their injuries.17 However, the decision in Farley is distin-
guishable from Wiersma because the West Virginia statute spoke only of
162. Id.
163. Id. (citing People v. Ford, 581 N.E.2d 1189, 1199 (111. App. Ct. 1991)).
164. Wiersma, 543 N.W.2d at 792 (footnote omitted) (citing KEETON ET AL, supra note
28, at 369).
165. Wiersma, 543 N.W.2d at 792.
166. A66 S.E.2d 522, 522 (W. Va. 1995).
167. Id. at 535 n.30.
168. Id. at 523.
169. Id. at 532.
170. Id. See also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS xxxi (6th ed.
1995) (discussing the traditional view of tort law as corrective justice allowing compensa-
tion for injured parties).
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a "person" and not an "unborn child."'
1 1
The West Virginia Court was cognizant of the majority of other states
calling for a distinction between viable and nonviable children in applying
wrongful death statutes, but it was not persuaded by this reasoning.172 It
viewed the majority position as "unjustified" and "unpersuasive. ' '173 The
court agreed with Justice Maddox's dissent in Gentry that drawing a
bright line between viability and non-viability to determine who is pro-
tected by the wrongful death statutes "necessarily resurrect[s] the same




Justice Maddox was correct when he noted that the debate concerning
wrongful death actions for nonviable fetuses has a familiar resonance
with the discussions that ultimately led to the adoption of wrongful death
statutes in the first place.175 As was the case in 184676 and 1946,177 the
law is working to correct what many view to be an injustice.1 71 However,
the countervailing view is that it is the legislature's responsibility to
change the status quo if the status quo is determined to be unjust.179 An-
other school of thought is that expansion of liability into nonviable
wrongful death would conflict with the United States Supreme Court's
171. See W. VA. CODE § 55-7-5 (1994) stating:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act neglect, or de-
fault, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not ensued)
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action to recover damages in re-
spect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who, or the corporation
which, would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action
for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the
death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to mur-
der in the first or second degree, or manslaughter.
Id.
172. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 533.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 533-34 (quoting Gentry v. Gilmore, 613 So. 2d 1241, 1246 (Ala. 1993) (Mad-
dox, J. dissenting)).
175. See id.
176. The year Lord Campbell's (Fatal Accidents) Act was enacted.
177. The year that Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946) departed from the
born-alive distinction.
178. See generally Meadows, supra note 43; Lingle, supra note 49; and Klasing, supra
note 68.
179. See Santana v. Zilog, 95 F.3d 780, 786 (9th Cir. 1996). See also Thiebert v. Milkva,
646 N.E.2d 1025, 1027 n.8 (Mass. 1995) (providing a list of the jurisdictions that agree with
the court's holding that expansion of liability is properly left to the legislature).
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abortion decisions, and therefore expansion of liability would be uncon-
stitutional. 18' An analysis of these arguments against expanding liability
in prenatal wrongful death actions demonstrates that they do not provide
compelling reasons to disavow one of the bedrock principles of our tort
law, giving "redress for personal injuries inflicted by the wrong or neglect
of another."18'
A. Similarities Between the "Viability" Distinction and Past Bright
Line Rules
While not every jurisdiction has stopped using the born-alive test first
set out in Bonbrest,182 most have abandoned the born alive rule, 8 a find-
ing it stringent and unjust. 1 84 Similarly, the single-entity view was re-
jected as archaic and outmoded due to subsequent developments in
science and technology.' 85 The viability test, at least in its application to
tort law, is likewise outmoded and archaic.' 86 The viability test does not
affect the defendant's legal duty, and its relative nature makes it an unsat-
isfactory criterion.'87 As is the case with any tort the issues at hand are
first, whether the defendant owed a duty of care to avoid unreasonable
risk of harm to others, second whether the defendant breached that duty
of care, and third whether that breach of duty caused the harm. 188
Although the age of a defendant's victims, whether they are born or un-
born, may be relevant in the analysis of the reasonable standard of care
for a particular case, it does not act as a bright line preventing the case
from ever reaching a jury. The viability line, although useful as a guide
for abortion cases, is an arbitrarily drawn line, 89 and if the law relies too
heavily on arbitrary line drawing it may very likely become the mechani-
cal, superficial, dry, sterile formalism of which Justice Stone warned. 90
An example of an unjust and illogical result of the mechanical applica-
180. See Toth v. Goree, 237 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Mich. App. 1975) (declining to expand
liability iato nonviable wrongful death actions).
181. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 56 N.E.2d 638, 641 (Ill. 1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting).
182. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
183. See Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 528 n.13 (W. Va. 1995) (providing a list of the
37 jurisdictions that permit recovery for the death of a viable fetus). See also infra note 17.
184. See Klasing, supra note 68, at 936-37.
185. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 529.
186. See Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787, 792 (S.D. 1996).
187. See KEETON ET AL, supra note 28, at 369.
188. EPSTEIN, supra note 170, at 166.
189. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
190. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946).
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tion of the viability bright line is Miller v. Kirk.'91 The court in Miller
held that an eighteen to twenty-two week old fetus injured in a car acci-
dent, who was subsequently born alive but then died minutes after birth,
was not protected under New Mexico's wrongful death statute because
the law permits only an action for the wrongful death of a viable fetus.19 2
This mechanical application of the viability test caused the New Mexico
Supreme Court to abandon the principle upon which the concept of pre-
natal torts was built, and upon which all fifty states had agreed, that if a
child is born alive he is permitted to maintain an action for those injuries,
and if he dies of such injuries after birth an action will lie for wrongful
death.'93 In following the viability test without taking into consideration
that the child was actually born and existed outside of its mother's womb,
if even for just a few minutes, the Miller Court may have sacrificed truth
to a mere theoretical abstraction, as did Holmes in Dietrich with his sin-
gle-entity rule.' 94
Focusing on a viability bright line test leads the courts applying that
test to drift away from the basic principles of our tort law, that we com-
pensate victims for the harm they have suffered through someone else's
intentional or negligent actions.' 95 To continue distinguishing between vi-
ability and non-viability of the fetus as a condition for the application of
wrongful death statutes, courts again impose the same type of unjust, ar-
bitrary, bright line test which initially necessitated the adoption of wrong-
ful death statutes.' 96 Application of the viability test engenders the same
type of unjust results that were prevalent before wrongful death actions
were instituted. Consequently, application of the viability test makes it
cheaper for someone to "kill" his nonviable victim than to merely injure
him.
B. The Legislature's Role in the Wrongful Death of A Nonviable Fetus
It took the development of wrongful death statutes by the states to
correct the injustice that it was cheaper to kill someone then merely to
injure him. Some courts, such as the Santana Court, have held that the
legislature must change the law in jurisdictions that do not recognize an
191. 905 P.2d 194 (N.M. 1995).
192. Id.
193. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 28, at 368.
194. See Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 56 N.E., 638, 641 (Ill. 1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting).
195. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 28, at 368-69.
196. See Gentry v. Gilmore, 613 So. 2d 1241, 1246 (Ala. 1993) (Maddox, J. dissenting).
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action for the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus.' 97 While this argu-
ment does have merits, it is incumbent upon the judiciary to interpret the
existing statutes, giving them meaning and supplementing them. 98 In
interpreting a statute, the courts must try to find "the best method to
further the general goal of the legislature in adopting such a statute, and
[the] common law principles governing its application." 9 9 Therefore,
when courts defer to the legislature to expand wrongful death protection
to the nonviable unborn, those courts are shirking their responsibility to
further the general goal of the legislation.2 °°
The general goal of wrongful death statutes is to protect human life by
deterring potential wrongdoing and allowing the family of a deceased in-
dividual to recover damages. 20' This goal is furthered when wrongful
death statutes include a nonviable fetus within the definition of a "per-
son.'2°: Previously, judicial action removed some of the artificial distinc-
tions, such as the single-entity rule and the born-alive rule, which barred
recoveiy.20 3 There is "no doubt the law will continue to need thoughtful
and vigorous judicial action to fill the gaps that inevitably exist in all stat-
utes, including, or especially, the wrongful death acts.) 20 4
When wrongful death statutes first entered the Anglo-American legal
landscape there was a great and widespread need for legislatures to adopt
wrongful death statutes to deter people from intentionally or negligently
killing one another, and to further the underlying principle of tort law,
that victims will be compensated for their injuries.20 5 In 1846, the need
for wrongful death statutes protecting nonviable unborn children was not
as widespread as was the need for general protection; however, this does
not indicate that the overall need was not as great. What it does indicate,
197. See Santana v. Zilog, Inc., 95 F.3d 780, 785 (9th Cir. 1996). See Thibert v. Milka,
646 N.E.2d 1025, 1026 (Mass. 1995).
198. Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 530 (W. Va. 1995).
199. M.
200. See id.
201. Gentry, 613 So. 2d at 1246 (Maddox, J., dissenting).
202. See id.
203. See discussion infra § II B.
204. ]K.EETON ET AL., supra note 28, at 960.
205. Pdthough criminal homicide laws of the age also deterred intentional and some-
times negligent killing of another, with no formal police departments until the late nine-
teenth century, the enforcement of laws was more of a private act or right rather than an
activity of the King or the government. The hope was that public peace would be pre-
served through this system of private right. See LEON RADZINOWIcZ, A HISTORY OF ENG-
LISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750 vii, 1-13, 171-98 (1956). The
passage of Lord Campbell's Act in 1846 was consistent with this notion that private rights
provided the proper deterrence to preserve the peace.
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is that this need is not so widespread to require legislation; it is the
smaller, more focused need for judicial action. It is well within the judici-
ary's discretion to fill in the gap in wrongful death statutes that protects
tortfeasors from liability based on the distinction of viability. It is the
judiciary's responsibility to meet these great needs for the small number
of people who have fallen through the gaps of wrongful death statutes.
C. The Supreme Court's Adoption of a Viability Test in Abortion
Cases Does Not Prevent Rejection of the Viability Test in
Nonviable Wrongful Death Actions
Some courts continue to use the viability test in wrongful death actions
because the United States Supreme Court views viability as the point at
which a state's interest in potential human life becomes compelling and
outweighs a woman's interest in having an abortion.2" 6 In addition, these
courts fear that rejection of the viability test might create an inherent
conflict between abortion decisions and wrongful death statutes.207 How-
ever, abortion decisions have no application to wrongful death statutes
because in wrongful death cases, there is no need to balance a woman's
interest against a state's interest.208 Abortion decisions are not control-
ling when analyzing wrongful death claims.20 9 Furthermore, defendants
in these cases have no privacy interest in need of protection; allowing
defendants to use a woman's right to privacy as a defense to their inva-
sion of her privacy is illogical on its face.210
The Supreme Court held that a fetus is not a "person" in terms of the
Fourteenth Amendment because "the unborn have never been recog-
nized in the law as persons in the whole sense," ' but could be recog-
nized as persons in a limited sense. 12 The Court also recognized that
"some States permit the parents of a stillborn child to maintain an action
206. See Toth v. Goree, 237 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Mich. App. 1975).
207. See id.
208. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (noting that some states permit prenatal
wrongful death actions, but that the issue at hand in Roe was the rights of the pregnant
woman).
209. See id.
210. See Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787, 790-91 (S.D. 1996) (rejecting
the argument that a woman's right to abortion precludes a cause of action for the wrongful
death of a nonviable because to do so would give the tortfeasor the same ability to termi-
nate a pregnancy as the mother) Id. at 791.
211. Id.
212. See id. (discussing the recognition of unborn children for property rights and
interests).
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for wrongful death because of prenatal injuries." '13 The Court noted that
the nature of such actions was to vindicate the parents' interest in poten-
tial life and thought that this was consistent with its view of a fetus.
214
In fact, the Supreme Court's abortion decisions and the decisions re-
garding expansion of wrongful death actions to include nonviable fetuses
have some common reasoning. The Supreme Court's view on abortion is
that a mother's privacy interests must be balanced with the state's interest
in protecting potential life.2 15 Expanding wrongful death protection to all
unborr children, regardless of viability, is consistent with both of these
interests. It is consistent with a state's legitimate interests in protecting
the health of a woman and the life of a fetus that may become a child,
because imposing liability on a tortfeasor protects the life of a mother
and a fetus by deterring those who might harm them.216
Expansion of wrongful death protection to all fetuses would also be
consistent with a woman's right to choose. Not only may a woman
choose to have an abortion, she may choose to carry her child to term. If
someone causes the death of a woman's unborn child, through intentional
or negligent conduct, that person has infringed upon the woman's choice
to have a baby, thus violating her right to privacy.217 Expansion of
wrongful death statutes does not violate a woman's right to have an abor-
tion. 'The Court in Casey stated that states cannot place a substantial ob-
stacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus,218
but in no way does expansion of prenatal wrongful death actions against
third persons place an obstacle or undue burden on a woman seeking an
abortion.21 9
IV. JUDICIAL ACTION DISCONTINUING VIABILITY REQUIREMENT IN
PRENATAL WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS WOULD ALLEVIATE SOME OF
THE CONFUSION SURROUNDING THE STATUS OF AN UNBORN CHILD
WHILE REMAINING CONSISTENT WITH THE SUPREME COURT'S
ABORTION DECISIONS
Some commentators believe that action must be taken to alleviate the
confusion and inconsistencies surrounding the law dealing with unborn
213. d. (footnote omitted).
214. See id.
215. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
216. See id.
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children. 2  They advocate the use of a single, all purpose definition of
"person" for constitutional, criminal, and tort issues. These critics call for
the use of an "all-in-one" definition of person not so much for the utility
or efficiency it would provide to our laws and jurisprudence, but as a
backdoor approach to attack a woman's abortion rights.221
A way to alleviate some of the confusion surrounding the law dealing
with unborn children is to reject the viability standard in all prenatal tort
actions, including wrongful death actions. This would not undermine a
woman's right to an abortion, or require an "all-in-one" definition of the
term "person." This proposal would not give one consistent definition of
the word "person" to be used in all areas of the law because an "all-in-
one" definition might cause more confusion and inconsistency.
Adopting an all-purpose definition of "person" may give consistency to
that term in general, but it could cause greater inconsistency in different
areas of the law. A new general definition might be inconsistent with a
certain area of law's development, history, and common law precedent.
The insistence of many critics on a single definition is fueled by the ulte-
rior motives of attacking a woman's abortion rights, and does not go to
the heart of the problem in prenatal law - confusion. This focus on the
exact definition of a word takes the mechanical and formalistic view of
the law of which Chief Justice Stone warned.222
Justice Holmes once said "[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and
unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color
and content according to the circumstances and the tone in which it is
220. See Klasing, supra note 68, at 977-79 (advocating a uniform definition of "person"
in all areas of law, and making conception the point at which a "person" is defined). See
also Agota Peterfy, Commentary, Fetal Viability as a Threshold to Personhood, 16 J. LEGAL
MED. 607, 635-36 (1995) (criticizing the inconsistencies in fetal personhood, and advocating
that states be given the power to make all decisions regarding fetuses).
221. See Klasing, supra note 68, at 978-79 stating:
It is therefore unlikely that a frontal attack on the right to abortion will succeed in
establishing rights for an unborn child .... Those who seek a uniform definition
of "person" that places proper value on an unborn child should begin to focus
more on wrongful death law and criminal homicide law . . . . A step by step
approach beginning with the "born alive" states, should have the effect of chang-
ing public attitude towards unborn children. Only when the public is changed,
will the United States Supreme Court change.
Id.
222. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946) (quoting Chief Justice
Stone as saying "[i]f our appraisals are mechanical and superficial, the law which they
generate will likewise be mechanical and superficial, to come at last but a dry sterile for-
malism"). Id. (quoting Stone, supra note 81, at 9-10).
Wrongful Death and the Unborn Child
used. '2, 2 3 For example, there are a number of different common usages of
the word "love." When a man says he loves his spouse, it has a different
meaning than when he says he loves his daughter, or his mother, or his
car. Definitions vary according to contexts; why not allow the law to have
the same flexibility? Why not allow slightly different definitions in the
different contexts of the various areas of law?
Instead of focusing on a strict, all purpose definition, courts could alle-
viate confusion by rejecting the arbitrary viability test in wrongful death
actions. Adopting a more fluid definition is the next logical step in the
development of wrongful death and prenatal injury law. While it was the
wrongful death statutes that first corrected the unjust result of the com-
mon law notion that it was cheaper to kill your victim than to injure him,
it was the judiciary that rejected the arbitrary line, which brought about
unjust results and blocked the underlying goals of the statutes, to provide
compensation to the families of wrongful death victims. 2 24 It is again
time for the courts to erase another arbitrary line, the line of viability.
Rejection of the viability test would not only be consistent with the
underlying goal of the wrongful death statutes, it would also be consistent
with the Supreme Court's abortion opinions.2 25 States cannot place an
undue burden on a woman's right to have an abortion,z2 6 but bringing an
action against a third party who intentionally or negligently terminated a
wanted pregnancy does not place any obstacle in the way of a woman
wanting to have an abortion. Extending the cause of action to all unborn
children would fit squarely with the other interest considered in Roe and
Casey, the state's interest in protecting potential life. 27 It is very unlikely
that under Casey an extension of wrongful death protection to all unborn
children could be found unconstitutional. In this simple but hopefully
effective proposal, state courts should adopt the minority view, as did the
Supreme Court of West Virginia in Farley v. Sartin.22 s
The Farley court was indeed sensitive to the smaller groups that occa-
sionally fall through the gaps of legislation written to cover the wide-
spread needs of the general population. The Farley court encouraged
legislative action, but it did not feel compelled to wait for the legislature
before it could allow the family of a dead unborn baby to at least have
223. Lingle, supra note 49, at 489 (quoting Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)).
224. See discussion infra § II.
225. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. V. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
226. Id.
227. See discussion infra § III C.
228. 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995).
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their day in court. In expanding the wrongful death cause of action to all
unborn children, the Supreme Court of West Virginia rejected what it
viewed to be an unjustified and unpersuasive majority position.2 2 9 The
majority position, allowing a cause of action for a viable unborn child, but
not a nonviable one, resurrects the same problems that the wrongful
death statutes were written to solve. 3 °
If more states followed the minority position and allowed the wrongful
death statutes to protect all unborn children, not just viable ones, the law
surrounding prenatal torts would be less confusing, and more just. As the
Supreme Court stated in Casey, the minority position allowing wrongful
death protection for all unborn children is consistent with the Supreme
Court's mandate that no state put any undue burden on a woman who
chooses to have an abortion.23 ' If the minority position were followed by
more states, then the injustice the wrongful death statutes were written to
correct could again be avoided.
V. CONCLUSION
George Santayana said that "those who can not remember the past are
condemned to repeat it .... This is the condition of children and barbari-
ans in whom instinct has learned nothing from experience. '232 Through-
out the development of the wrongful death action and recognition of
prenatal torts, the law has acted on instinct as well as experience. The
instinct of the common law let tortfeasors who killed their victims get
away without facing any civil liability. This unjust result, based on an
errant instinct, was corrected after it had been learned through experi-
ence that it was intolerable to allow it to be cheaper to kill someone than
to scratch him. Justice Holmes's instinct that an unborn child does not
have any independent rights or causes of action was corrected through
later judicial action based on the experience that the law must keep pace
with science and technology.
The issue of wrongful death for a nonviable fetus is still an unsettled
issue in the law. Whether courts will act upon their instinct and do noth-
ing, or act upon experience and adopt Farley remains to be seen. The
only obstacle keeping courts from expanding wrongful death actions to
nonviable fetuses is the courts' instinct that the legislature must provide
229. See id. at 532.
230. See id. at 533-34.
231. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
232. GEORGE SANTAYANA, 1 THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (1905).
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direction. Courts, however, have long extended the protection of such
statutes to unborn children who are viable at the time of the injury and
subsequently born alive. Furthermore, extending a statute's protection to
cover a nonviable fetus is well within the scope of legitimate judicial in-
terprelation. By adopting the minority view, and thus rejecting the viabil-
ity test in wrongful death actions, courts would be taking the next logical
step in the history of the development of the wrongful death action, with-
out infringing on a woman's right to privacy in her choice about abortion.
Therefore, viability should no longer be a prerequisite for a wrongful
death ause of action. Otherwise, the law will again be the child who,
acting on instinct rather than experience, is condemned to repeat an un-
fair and unjust history.
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